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 Private Power, Public Interest: 
An Examination of Search 
Engine Accountability 
 Emily B.  Laidlaw * 
 Abstract 
 As information becomes a critical commodity in modern society, the issue 
is raised whether the entities that manage access to information, that are 
tools for public discourse and democracy, should be accountable to the 
public. The Internet has transformed how we communicate, and search 
engines have emerged as managers of information, organizing and cat-
egorizing content in a coherent, accessible manner thereby shaping the 
Internet user’s experience. This article examines whether search engines 
should have public interest obligations. In order to answer this question, 
this article fi rst examines comparative public interest regulatory struc-
tures, and the growing importance of the Internet to public discourse. 
Then examined is how the algorithmic designs and manual manipulation 
of rankings by search engines affects the public interest without a suf-
fi cient accountability structure. Finally, the values necessary to a public 
interest framework are suggested. 
 1  Introduction 
 We are living in an  ‘ Information Society ’ 1 wherein information is now a 
critical commodity, and those that control this information, whether access 
to or delivery of it or its content, are in key positions of power. As the Inter-
net infi ltrates the very nature of how people relate and communicate, a 
 * PhD Candidate, Department of Law, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE,  e.b.laidlaw@lse.ac.uk 
 1  See discussion in Webster,  Theories of the Information Society (London: Routledge, 2 nd ed, 2002), chapter 2. 
 at London School of econom
ics on Novem
ber 2, 2010
ijlit.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC INTEREST: AN EXAMINATION OF SEARCH ENGINE ACCOUNTABILITY
114
spotlight shines on the companies that make these communications pos-
sible. By controlling the communication infrastructure of the Internet, 
they have become information gatekeepers. What they do increasingly 
embraces principles central to our democracy such as discourse, freedom 
of expression and public knowledge. 2 This has attracted the attention 
of policy makers who question whether or not the public should be pro-
tected from unrestricted and unaccountable private power over such an 
important communications resource. Search engines, it will be argued, 
are the new information gatekeepers, and have so far slipped through the 
regulatory net, operating without burdens and without regulation. 
 In his book  The Control Revolution , Andrew Shapiro calls for  ‘ collective 
public action ’ to create a balance between the market and government, 3 
identifying control of communication resources as a signifi cant battle-
ground between the market and government. 4 He warned that if the Inter-
net’s communication resources are unregulated, an oligopoly of private 
power would result, thus  ‘ dashing ’ the freedoms promised by these com-
munication resources. 5 He suggested the following guiding principle:
 In a democratic society, those who control access to information have a 
responsibility to support the public interest. By dint of their power over 
such an important resource, these gatekeepers must assume an obliga-
tion as trustees of the greater good. Indeed, barring some clear show-
ing that they are bearing this burden voluntarily, government should 
impose it upon them. 6 
 While this author does not agree that a public interest obligation neces-
sitates government interference, Shapiro raises interesting questions that 
have become central to this article. Before assessing who should regu-
late the Internet and in what contexts, certain critical questions must be 
asked. We must step back for a moment and examine the relationship 
between private companies and information, which will inform the nature 
of any regulatory constructs that may be imposed. One must ask: Where 
do search engines fi t in the idea of the democratizing force of the Inter-
net? Do search engines carry out a public function? Is there a shortfall in 
their accountability that can harm users? To that end, this article exam-
ines whether search engines should have public interest obligations, and 
identifi es the values that a public interest framework should exhibit. 
 2  Phrasing is from Shapiro,  The Control Revolution: How the Internet is Putting Individuals in Charge and 
Changing the World We Know (New York: Public Affairs 1999) at p 224. 
 3  Ibid. at p 222. 
 4  Ibid. at p 224. This is the famous  ‘ east coast code versus west coast code ’ articulated by Lawrence Lessig: 
Lessig,  Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books 1999). On the one hand, Congress enacts laws, 
while West Coast code writers, through design of software and hardware, determine how the Internet works: 
how information is to be accessed, transmitted, and stored thereby defi ning the user experience. Code, Lessig 
proposes, is law, because by building the environment of the  ‘ social life ’ , it constrains behaviour: ibid. at p 53. 
 5  n 2 above, at p 224. 
 6  Ibid. at p 225. 
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 2  Defi nitions 
 This section contextualises search engines within the notion of online 
intermediaries and gatekeepers. Search engines are not the only gate-
keepers of the Internet, and a public interest duty can also be justifi ed for 
various other online gatekeepers. 
 An information or  ‘ online ’ intermediary is a middleman between the 
user and the provider of information. 7 In this role, the intermediary facili-
tates access to information (or realizes prevention of access), organizes, 
retrieves, presents, and guides consumers in their information experi-
ence. Depending on the function of the intermediary, it may also be a 
gatekeeper. 
 Gatekeeping connotes more control than the term intermediary; an 
additional, more specifi c, function must be carried out. In sociological 
terms, it refers to  ‘ an individual who occupies a position that allows him or 
her to control access to goods, information, and services. ’ 8 In traditional 
media, this can be defi ned as those who select  ‘ who and what should be 
given access to channels of publicity or made visible in the public arena. ’ 9 
Europe’s Electronic Commerce Directive 10 implicitly recognizes these dif-
ferences in assigning varying liability to service providers depending on 
their functions as mere conduits, caching, or hosts. 11 
 Broadly, intermediary functions can be categorized in terms of their 
communication services: 12 
 Internet Service Providers ( ‘ ISP ’ ): ISPs act as conduits between the infor-
mation source and the recipient. Early in the Internet’s commercializa-
tion, ISPs were mainly telephone companies, but now other players also 
offer this service, including cable companies and others with the money 
and resources to do so. Ronald Mann and Seth Belzley articulate three 
roles that ISPs play: backbone providers, source ISPs, and destination 
ISPs. 13 Backbone ISPs transmit data to the endpoints. 14 Destination ISPs 
connect the user to the Internet and the World Wide Web, while Source 
ISPs provide publishing services and online availability to the content 
 7  See Hamelink,  World Communication: Disempowerment & Self-Empowerment (London: Zed Books 1995) 
at p 5. 
 8  Calhoun (ed),  Dictionary of Social Sciences (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). 
 9  McQuail,  Media Accountability and Freedom of Publication (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003) at 
p 128. Jonathan Zittrain does not differentiate between these terms as starkly as this author, preferring 
to defi ne a gatekeeper as being  ‘ intermediaries of various kinds ’ such as businesses that host, index, 
and carry others ’ content: Zittrain,  ‘ A History of Online Gatekeeping ’ (2006) 19(2)  Harvard Journal of 
Law & Technology at p 253-254. 
 10  Directive 2000/31/EC (Directive on Electronic Commerce). 
 11  Ibid., articles 12-15. 
 12  There are various ways to categorise online intermediaries. Mann and Belzley prefer to differentiate 
on the basis of the service provided: ISPs, Payment Intermediaries (i.e. Paypal) and Auction Intermediar-
ies (i.e. eBay): Mann & Belzley,  ‘ The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability ’ (2005) 47  William & Mary 
Law Review 239 at p 246. 
 13  Ibid. at pp 255-257. 
 14  Ibid. 
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provider. 15 ISPs are more appropriately described as intermediaries than 
gatekeepers, although they can take on gatekeeping functions when a 
more specifi c step, such as fi ltering content, is taken. 
 Search Engines : At its most basic level, search engines are websites that 
help users fi nd information on other websites. 16 They have been variously 
described as akin to library catalogues or the Yellow Pages index. 17 As the 
number of websites multiplies, search engines become increasingly impor-
tant resources for organizing the clutter of information on the Internet. 18 
They have become  ‘ the new linchpins on the Internet. ’ 19 Although every 
search engine functions differently, certain common functionalities can 
be identifi ed. Computer robots called spiders crawl the Internet for 
information, index key words, and allow users to search for words on this 
index. 20 They range from meta-search engines that aggregate the results 
from several search engines, to general search engines, to issue-specifi c 
search engines for scholarship, travel and various other themes. 
 The current leading brands on the Internet according to Nielson 
NetRatings all have a search engine as part of their business portfolio: 
Yahoo!, Microsoft, MSN (which is owned by Microsoft), Google, AOL and 
eBay (which although it is an auction business, it is operated by a search 
engine). 21 However, despite the plethora of search engines, 22 there are 
arguably only two major search engines: Google and Yahoo!. 23 Although 
this paper will argue for public interest regulation of all search engines, 
the focus will be on Google and Yahoo! because of their dominance of the 
search market. 
 Content Providers and Hosts : Hosts are the systems that store data 24 in any 
form capable of proprietary protection such as text, graphic, audio and 
video. We are concerned here, in particular, with companies that host sites 
 15  Ibid. 
 16  See  http://www.howstuffworks.com (last visited 25 June 2008), and Grimmelman,  ‘ The Structure of 
Search Engine law ’ (2007) 93  Iowa Law Review 1 at p 6. 
 17  Van Couvering,  ‘ New Media? The Political Economy of Internet Search Engines ’ , presented to the 
Communication Technology Policy section at the 2004 Conference of the International Association of 
Media & Communications Researchers at p 3. 
 18  Zarsky,  ‘ Search Engines, Media Concentration and the Marketplace of Ideas ’ (Draft), position paper 
presented at the Regulating Search Symposium, Yale Law School, 2005 at p 3, at  http://islandia.law.yale.
edu/isp/regulatingsearch.html (last visited 10 July 2007). 
 19  Grimmelmann, n 16 above, at p 3. 
 20  http://www.howstuffworks.com , above n 16;  http://www.searchenginehistory.com (last visited 25 
June 2008). Some search engines operate like a directory where inclusion on the index is paid for: see 
discussion below 4.3.1. 
 21  ‘ Top Ten Brands in Internet ’ at  http://www.internetworldstats.com/top10.htm (last visited 25 June 
2008). 
 22  See  ‘ LM Search and Web Searches ’ at  http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/reference.and.resource.miscellany/
web.search.html (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 23  n 17 above, at p 24. Google Watch adds Microsoft and AskJeeves to this list:  ‘ And Then There Were 
Four ’ at  http://www.google-watch.org/bigbro.html (last visited 25 June 2008). For further discussion, 
see below 4.3.1. 
 24  See, for example,  http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/H/host.htm (last visited 25 June 2008). 
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for blogs, bulletin boards, video sharing, fi le sharing, and so on. A con-
tent provider, borrowing from the Communications Decency Act 25 section 
230(f)(3), is  ‘ any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, 
for the creation or development of information provided through the 
Internet or any other interactive computer service. ’ 26 The role of content 
providers and hosts as gatekeepers, both commercial and private, raises 
several issues worthy of further research. 
 Any understanding of the meaning of  ‘ information intermediary ’ must 
be accompanied by a warning that its meaning is protean in its manifesta-
tion. This is largely for two reasons. First, the leading Internet businesses 
cannot be neatly categorised as content providers, ISPs, or search engines. 
Most cannot agree on the categories. In addition, the concentration of 
the market, and diversifi cation of business interests, has created an oli-
gopoly of private power. For example, although search continues to be 
Google’s primary business, 27 its ’ business has expanded far beyond simple 
search. This diversifi cation of business interests, largely ignored in its own 
description of what the company does, 28 is a focus of concern for privacy 
experts and competition experts. 29 
 This concentration of the market combined with the diversity of such 
businesses services intensifi es the importance of determining whether 
search engines have a public interest function necessitating regulation. 
 25  (1996) 47 U.S.C. 
 26  Ibid., s 230(f)(3). 
 27  Google still treats improving search as its primary mission:  ‘ Google’s mission is to organize the world’s 
information and make it universally accessible and useful ’ :  ‘ Investor FAQ ’ at  http://investor.google.com/
faq.html (last visited 25 June 2008). In terms of search, Google has created specialist sites to search for 
such things as products, blogs, desktops, scholarly materials, books, news, and videos:  http://www.google.
com/intl/en/options/ (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 28  Ibid.,  http://investor.google.com/faq.html . 
 29  Google now offers maps and satellite images of the Earth and of city streets, the latter currently 
heavily criticized for potentially breaching individuals ’ privacy: Robertson,  ‘ Google’s Street View could be 
unlawful in Europe ’ at  http://www.out-law.com//page-8116 (last visited 25 June 2008). It has introduced 
applications such as email ( ‘ Gmail ’ ), and Docs and Spreadsheets. It has ventured into the market of 
content sharing with YouTube (video), Picasa (pictures and graphics), Sketch Up (design), and social net-
working with Orkut and Blogger: n 27 above,  http://www.google.com/intl/en/options/ , and 2006 An-
nual Report,  ‘ Letter from the Founders ’ at  http://investor.google.com/2006_founders_letter.html (last 
visited 25 June 2008). In pursuit of its ’ goal to create  ‘ a single and complete advertising system ’ (ibid.) 
Google bought DoubleClick, which raised both anti-competitive concerns (for which it was investigated 
and cleared by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission:  ‘ Federal Trade Commission Closes Google/Double-
Click Investigation ’ at  http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/googledc.shtm (last visited 24 June 2008)) and 
privacy concerns:  ‘ Consumers groups alarmed by Google online ad merger ’ at  http://www.euractiv.com 
(last visited 18 July 2007). Most recently, Google is moving into the online security market with its agree-
ment to purchase Postini:  http://googleinvestors.blogspot.com/ (last visited 25 June 2008). For further 
information on Google’s business plans see this blog. 
 Like Google, Yahoo! has diversifi ed its business from its early days as an online directory. It describes 
itself as  ‘ the No. 1 Internet brand globally ’ :  http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/faq.cfm (last visited 25 
June 2008). Most notably, it quickly diversifi ed into a web portal, presenting information from various 
sources regarding,  inter alia , entertainment, news, and business investments. In addition, it now offers 
applications such as Yahoo!mail, Del.icio.us (a social bookmark manager), Flickr (a photo host) and 
MyBlogLog: E. Sokullu,  ‘ Yahoo! 2.0: Its Reorganization and Future ’ at  www.readwriteweb.com/archives/
yahoo_reorganization_future.php (last visited 25 June 2008). 
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 3  The Internet as a Public Interest Medium 
 In crafting a public interest obligation for search engine providers, anal-
ogy will be made from the recognition that traditional media carries out a 
business of importance to society. The public interest notion for both the 
media and the Internet is rooted in their shared role as conveyors of infor-
mation and facilitators of public discourse. This will be used as a platform 
to launch an inquiry into the unique public interest of search engines. It 
is an issue of accountability, a more accessible word for our purposes, par-
ticularly in the context of online gatekeepers, which has been defi ned as, 
to explain one’s actions and justify them on normative grounds. 30 
 3.1  Theories of Public Interest in Traditional Media 
 For the purposes of this article, public interest is not intended to connote 
the more limited defi nition employed in the media context for defences 
to defamation actions or public service broadcasting. Rather, this term is 
used in the broad form embraced by theorists for the central role of cer-
tain industries in the functioning of democracy. In this context, the defi ni-
tion of public interest articulated by Denis McQuail shall be used:
 [T]hey carry out a number of important, even essential, informational 
and cultural tasks and it is in the general interest (or good of the ma-
jority) that these are carried out well and according to principles of 
effi ciency, justice, fairness, and respect for current social and cultural 
values. 31 
 The origins of public interest regulation are with public utilities, such 
as transport and electricity. 32 They were perceived as businesses  ‘ affected 
with a public interest ’ , 33 justifying imposition of regulation to ensure ade-
quacy of service (assurance of equity of access and effi ciency) and to con-
trol monopolies. 34 
 Although public interest regulation of the media grew out of this 
arena, the media is different. Justifi cation is largely found in the freedoms 
inspired and facilitated by the media. 35 There is little disagreement now 
as to the idea of public interest in the media, but consensus is lost when 
 30  McQuail, n 9 above, at p 15. In McQuail’s view, the basic values of media accountability are truth, 
freedom, order and cohesion, solidarity and equality, right purpose and responsibility: ibid., chapter 4. 
 31  Ibid. at p 47. 
 32  McQuail,  Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest (London: Sage Publications 
1992) ( ‘ McQuail2 ’ ) at p 21. William Melody gives the following examples of businesses affected with a 
public interest:  ‘ [i]nns, wharves, bridges, canals, grain warehouses, railways, electricity, gas, water, tele-
phone and other services ’ : Melody,  ‘ Communication Policy in the Global Information Economy: Whither 
the Public Interest? ’ in Ferguson(ed),  Public Communication: the New Imperatives, Future Directions for Media 
Research (London: Sage Publications 1990) at p 30. 
 33  Ibid. 
 34  McQuail2, n 32 above, at pp 4, 21-22. 
 35  Ibid. at p 21. 
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trying to formulate the exact qualities of this public interest and how it 
should be manifested. 36 
 Traditional media is at a crossroads as much as the Internet, grappling 
with changing technologies, convergence, and concentration of the mar-
ket, leading some to argue that the notion of  ‘ public interest ’ for tradi-
tional media needs to be re-defi ned. 37 What should be the goal of public 
interest obligations? One view is that a public interest obligation has three 
functions in a democracy: to facilitate judgment and comment on govern-
ment actions; for the common good; and as a general check on actions. 38 
Although the Internet cannot be seamlessly inserted into such a public 
interest framework, analogy can be drawn from the theoretical purpose of 
public interest regulation of the media. 
 Treating the media as having a public function is justifi ed because of 
its central role in public discourse. 39 To achieve a vision of a participatory 
democracy, citizens must have the opportunity to be informed and to be 
heard, and the media are the primary source of such news and informa-
tion. 40 They organize, fi lter, and interpret information for the public. In 
so doing, they embrace a powerful role, because they shape public opin-
ion and meaning. Thus regulation has focused on ensuring  ‘ media access 
that refl ect the broad interests of the general public ’ , 41 such as balanced 
reporting, diversity of content, and rights of reply. 42 
 The media’s activities are central to the theoretical justifi cations for 
freedom of expression. 43 Eric Barendt identifi es four categories of his-
torical justifi cations for freedom of expression: from self-fulfi lment, from 
truth, from democracy, and from suspicion of government. 44 The media 
might serve one or more of these categories, but it is the argument from 
democracy that is most persuasive. The argument from democracy focuses 
on the idea that participation in discussions and debate are central to 
the functioning of democracy. 45 As a self-standing theory of freedom of 
expression it can be somewhat limiting as such expression is only pro-
tected to the extent that it serves democracy. However, in the context of 
the media, it heightens its power and responsibilities as servants of democ-
racy. The media is arguably  ‘ the main cultural institution and the princi-
pal means of public expression in contemporary society ’ , 46 whose main 
 36  Ibid. at p 3-4. 
 37  See Feintuck &Varney,  Media Regulation, Public Interest and the Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2 nd ed, 2006). 
 38  McQuail2, n32 above, at p 20. 
 39  n 37 above. 
 40  Melody, n 32 above, at pp 18-19. 
 41  Ibid. at p 19. 
 42  Ibid. 
 43  n 37 above, at p 15. 
 44  Barendt,  Freedom of Expression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 nd ed, 2005), chapter 1. 
 45  Ibid. at p 18. 
 46  McQuail, n 9 above, at p 4. 
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role is to  ‘ promote an effective public space ’ . 47 As such, they have a crucial 
job in making sure that citizens are informed in order to further their role 
in democracy. 48 
 This notion of the media as a force for freedom of expression, and 
a servant of democracy, is the basis for the argument that the media is 
within the public sphere. 49 Termed by Jurgen Habermas in  The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere , 50 he used it to describe a metaphori-
cal space protected for rational public discourse on issues of common 
concern. 51 Since few citizens can gather at once for such discourse,  ‘ the 
mass media have become the chief institutions of the public sphere. ’ 52 
The media’s role is to promote this public space so that diverse viewpoints 
can be voiced, debated and resolved and public opinion formed. 53 Hab-
ermas ’ view has been criticized as naive, idealistic and undemocratic, in 
addition to underplaying the media’s power for negative infl uence. 54 Not-
withstanding, it is the crucial role of the media in enhancing democracy 
that resonates regarding the Internet, and search engines in particular. 
 3.2  The Democratizing Force of the Internet 
 In order to impose any public interest obligations on Internet businesses, 
these businesses must carry out activities that are important in the func-
tioning of democracy, which raises the initial question of the metal-level 
importance of the Internet to democracy. 
 Information societies are so defi ned for having  ‘ become dependent upon 
complex electronic information and communication networks ’ 55 in order 
to function effi ciently. Information is arguably  ‘ a distinguishing feature of 
the modern world. ’ 56 It infi ltrates all aspects of daily life from  ‘ public life, 
to work, leisure, education, and consumption ’ . 57 Although information has 
historically been recognized as integral to the effective functioning of society, 
its role is now different and more complex due largely to the technological 
communication networks that have been developed changing not only how 
information is accessed, communicated, retrieved, and interpreted, 58 but also 
the speed with which this is done. Manuel Castells frames information and 
 47  Ibid. at p 62. 
 48  n 37 above, at p 5. 
 49  McQuail, n 9 above, at p 4; n 37 above, at p 15. 
 50  Habermas,  The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society 
(Translated Cambridge: Polity 1992). 
 51  McQuail2, n 32 above, at p 6; McQuail, n 9 above, at p 61; Papacharissi,  ‘ The Virtual Sphere: the 
internet as a public sphere ’ (2002) 4(1)  New Media & Society 9 at pp 10-11. 
 52  n 37 above, at p 15 (quoting Dahlgren). 
 53  McQuail, n 9 above, at p 61-62. 
 54  n 37 above, at p 15-16; Papacharissi, n 51 above, at p 11-12. 
 55  Melody, n 32 above, at p 26-7. 
 56  n 1 above, at p 1. 
 57  McQuail, n 9 above, at p 4. 
 58  See Melody, n 32 above, at p 30-31. 
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communication technologies as giving priority to information fl ows, spur-
ring an era of  ‘ information capitalism ’ . 59 Now,  ‘ access to information and 
communication would appear to be the most essentially public utility. ’ 60 
 Urs Gasser suggests three core democratic values to the Internet. First, 
the value of informational autonomy in the sense that an individual has 
the right to choose between various sets of information, but also the right 
to express his or her opinions, and create sources of information. 61 Sec-
ond, he promotes diversity in the information sources and distribution. 62 
Third, since we are increasingly dependent on the information we access 
on the Internet, the quality of this information is a value. 63 Such formula-
tions derive from a recognition that the Internet’s primary function is as 
 ‘ a conveyor of information. ’ 64 In contrast to traditional media, the costs 
to becoming a speaker in cyberspace are low, and the distributed architec-
ture of the Internet have  ‘ fundamentally altered ’ the capacity of individu-
als to engage in the public sphere. 65 
 The Internet has emerged as an essential source for access to infor-
mation and communication. It is rapidly approaching television with its 
market penetration. The Internet and Multimedia 2007 report states that 
33 per cent of surveyed consumers view the Internet as the most essential 
medium, trailing television by only three per cent. 66 Over one billion peo-
ple in the world use the Internet. 67 The Internet is also closing in on other 
mediums with respect to time individuals devote to its use. On average, 
users spend one quarter of their weekly media time on the Internet. 68 Yet 
what is most compelling is the growing role of the Internet in self-devel-
opment. 69 In a study by the Pew Internet & American Life Project, 45 per 
cent of American Internet users said that  ‘ the [I]nternet helped them to 
make big decisions or negotiate their way through major episodes in their 
lives in the previous two years. ’ 70 The Internet played a sometimes major 
 59  n 1 above, at p 100. 
 60  Melody, n 32 above, at p 31. 
 61  Gasser,  ‘ Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead ’ (2006) 9  Yale Journal of Law 
& Technology 124 at p 150. 
 62  Ibid. at p 151. 
 63  Ibid. at pp 152-153. 
 64  Introna & Nissenbaum,  ‘ Shaping the Web: Why the politics of search engines matters ’ (2000) 16(3) 
 The Information Society 169 at p 179. 
 65  Benkler,  The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 2006) at p 212. 
 66  Needle,  ‘ Internet Closing in on TV as  ‘ Most Essential ’ Medium ’ at  www.internetnews.com/bus-news/
print.php/3685711 (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 67  ‘ Sample Internet Statistics Compendium July 2007 ’ at  http://www.e-consultancy.com/publications/
internet-stats-compendium/ (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 68  Ibid. 
 69  See for example, discussion of the cultural elements of breast cancer patients ’ use of internet spaces 
by Orgad,  ‘ The cultural dimensions of online communication: a study of breast cancer patients ’ internet 
spaces ’ (2006) 8(6)  New Media & Society 877. 
 70  Horrigan & Rainie,  ‘ The Internet’s Growing Role in Life’s Major Moments ’ Pew Internet & American 
Life Project (2006) at  http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Major per cent20Moments_2006.pdf (last 
visited 25 June 2008). 
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role for American users regarding such critical life experiences as illness, 
careers, home and fi nance. 71 The democratizing force of the Internet 
is taking shape, becoming a tool for speech as a component of one’s 
self-fulfi lment. 72 
 3.3  Public Interest Regulatory Structures 
 The media’s core role is to publish. 73 They have a direct relationship 
with the consumer as an information source, which informs the regula-
tory approaches between the three different kinds of media. First, under 
the print media model, the least degree of regulation is imposed both in 
the United Kingdom and North America. 74 It is consultative in the sense 
that the user chooses what newspaper to read, if any, and what articles to 
read therein. This may be described as the pull model and includes other 
media such as fi lm and music. 75 The second model is for common carriers 
such as mail, telegraph and telephone, which are interactive in nature and 
facilitate point-to-point individual interaction. 76 Such media are histori-
cally considered public resources. The third model is the broadcasting or 
 ‘ push ’ model, wherein publishing is from one to many. 77 This industry is 
heavily regulated on the basis of spectrum scarcity, and due to the poten-
tially invasive nature of broadcasting in a person’s private home. 
 The Internet is arguably part of the mass media 78 as a giant, interactive 
publishing house. Yet, the businesses that facilitate the functioning of the 
Internet and access to the information thereon are not necessarily publish-
ers. Unless these businesses are content providers, they are one or more 
steps removed from the publishing process, and are often more akin to 
the common carrier analogy with the telecommunications industry. Even 
hosts of websites, such as youtube.com, do not create content but rather 
provide space and storage for others to publish videos. Editorial control 
is generally avoided, if possible, by hosts of any interactive sites in order 
to avoid incurring liability for the contents therein. 79 Search engines are 
a hybrid. While they are in essence websites that index other sites on the 
Internet, they have reached a level of power and infl uence akin to televi-
sion networks and Hollywood studios. 80 Recently, a court in the United 
 71  Ibid. summary at  http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/181/report_display.asp (last visited 25 June 
2008). 
 72  n 44 above, at p 13-18. 
 73  McQuail, n 9 above, at p 4. 
 74  Ibid. at p 108. 
 75  Ibid. at pp 108-110. 
 76  Ibid. 
 77  Ibid. 
 78  See, for example, Orgad,  ‘ The internet as a moral space: the legacy of Roger Silverstone ’ (2007) 9(1) 
 New Media & Society 33 at p 34, and n 64 above. But see n 17 above. 
 79  This is particularly so in Europe where liability depends, to an extent, on knowledge and control: see 
Electronic Commerce Directive, n 10 above. 
 80  n 17 above, at p 3. 
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States went so far as to characterize Google’s search results as  ‘ opinion ’ 
and protected by the First Amendment. 81 
 Within the regulatory models in traditional media, the Internet adopts 
some of all three functions. To describe the Internet as a pull technol-
ogy would be to oversimplify the infrastructure of the Internet and the 
businesses that exploit it. Roy Rosenzweig describes the Internet as 
a  ‘ meta-medium ’  ‘ that combines aspects of the telephone, post offi ce, 
movie theatre, television, newspaper, shopping mall, street corner, and 
a great deal more. ’ 82 It is a platform for broadcasting, group discussion, 
pulpit preaching and researching, and for a variety of content types such 
as text, video, audio, and image. 83 While others caution that incorporat-
ing the Internet as a whole into the media category might be inappropri-
ate, describing it rather as  ‘ a technological infrastructure that affords a 
range of uses ’ , 84 such a characterization fails to recognize the Internet’s 
democratic force. It is indeed a meta-medium, with the implication that 
it cannot be pigeonholed into an existing communication model because 
technological developments and convergence have not only blurred the 
boundaries of these models but also entirely collapsed them. It is nec-
essary then to view the Internet, and the businesses that operate it, as 
unique. 
 If the Internet is an important democratic force, then the institutions 
that facilitate this public discourse become the target for any public inter-
est obligations. One such key industry is search engines. 
 4  The Public Interest Duty of Search Engines 
 4.1  Why Search Engines owe a Public Interest Duty: They Control 
Our Informational Experience 
 Search engines are more dynamic than simple indices of websites. This is 
refl ected in James Grimmelmann’s defi nition that a search engine  ‘ com-
bines its own knowledge of available content with user queries to pro-
vide recommendations to its users ’ . 85 It tips its hat at the power of search 
engines to channel users ’ attentions to certain information and sites. 
There is an informational fl ow to the functioning of search engines, 86 and 
 81  Search King v  Google Technology, Inc. 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D.Okla.). See discussion below 4.3.2 sub-
heading  ‘ Removal at Search Engine Behest ’ . 
 82  Rosenzweig,  ‘ How Will the Net’s History Be Written? Historians and the Internet ’ in Nissenbaum & 
Price (eds),  Academy & the Internet (New York: Peter Lang, 2004) at p 26. See also DiMaggio  et al. ,  ‘ Social 
Implications of the Internet ’ , Ibid. at p 36. 
 83  Ibid. 
 84  n 17 above, at p 6. 
 85  Grimmelmann, n 16 above, at p 4. 
 86  Ibid. at p 7. 
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by controlling this fl ow search engines have set themselves up as gatekeep-
ers and gateways to the informational experience:
 1.  [T]he search engine gathers content; 
 2.  a user queries the search engine; 
 3.  the search engine provides the user with results; 
 4.  the user obtains the content. 87 
 These fl ows involve several players: the search engines, content provid-
ers, users, government, intellectual property owners and other concerned 
parties. 88 By controlling the structure of how information is accessed, 
search engines control the information fl ow. Without more, this might not 
be as consequential, however, search engines are now the portals through 
which the information on the Internet is experienced. They are seen as 
authoritative and reliable, and shape public opinion and meaning. 
 Search engines are some of the most commonly viewed websites on the 
Internet, almost equalling email for their commonality of use. 89 As stated 
by Helen Nissenbaum and Lucas D. Introna,  ‘ [t]o exist is to be indexed by 
a search engine. ’ 90 Their role is one of facilitation of access to information 
rather than direct access to information. 91 As facilitators, they have grown 
into a critical role on which users depend to make information more easily 
accessible. 92 Contrary to the problems of bandwidth scarcity that motivated 
much of current broadcasting regulation, the Internet struggles to manage 
information clutter.  93 This plethora of information is combined with a lack 
of knowledge regarding how to fi nd it. Without search engines a user must 
know the URL (uniform resource locator, or web page address). In Germany, 
a 2004 survey indicated that 75 per cent of users rely on search engines  ‘ as 
their principal means of fi nding web pages. ’ 94 As a result, search engines are 
the principal fi gures in sorting through and organizing information. 95 
 87  Ibid. 
 88  Grimmelman sees the information fl ow as only involving four players: search engines, content provid-
ers, users and concerned third parties: ibid. In this authors view, governments and intellectual property 
owners are signifi cant stakeholders in the information fl ows and must be identifi ed separately from gen-
eral concerned third parties. 
 89  Hargittai,  ‘ The Social, Political, Economic, and Cultural Dimensions of Search Engines: An Introduc-
tion ’ (2007) 12  Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 3 at p 1. 
 90  n 64 above, at p 171. 
 91  Van Eijk,  ‘ Search Engines: Seek and Ye Shall Find? The Position of Search Engines in Law ’ Iris  plus , 
Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory, Issue 2006-02 at p 5. 
 92  Ibid.; DiMaggio, n 82 above, at p 42. 
 93  n 18 above, at p 3; Elkin-Koren,  ‘ Let the Crawlers Crawl: on Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to 
Exclude Indexing ’ (2000-01) 26  University of Dayton Law Review 179 at p 180. 
 94  Schulz  et al,  ‘ Search Engines as Gatekeepers of Public Communication: Analysis of the German frame-
work applicable to internet search engines including media law and anti trust law ’ (2005) 6(1)  German 
Law Journal 1419 at p 1421. 
 95  n 18 above, at p 3. 
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 Yet, 80 per cent of sites visited are just 0.5 per cent of the available 
websites, 96 and one-quarter of the most visited websites are  ‘ portal ’ sites, 
such as Yahoo! and AOL, which might provide,  inter alia, search engines, 
category guides, shopping, and information services. 97 Additionally, most 
users do not link to sites listed on these indices beyond the fi rst or second 
page of the search results. 98 One study states that 80.6 per cent of users 
review the fi rst page of search results, while only 13.2 per cent view the 
second page of results. 99 Thus to be seen is to not only be indexed, but to 
be highly ranked in the search results. 
 The market for search engines also raises further concern. While there 
are several search engines available to a user, the market is signifi cantly 
more concentrated than just a few years ago. A June 2007 study by Nielsen/
Net Ratings, shows that Google holds 52.7 per cent of total searches, fol-
lowed by Yahoo! at 20.2 per cent, and MSN at 13.3 per cent. 100 Arguably, 
Yahoo! and Google are the only major search engines. 101 
 Search engines do more than just rank and organize information. They 
represent a broader struggle  ‘ to sustain the democratic potential of tra-
ditional media, the Internet, and the World Wide Web in particular. ’ 102 
They are not simply directories, as has been asserted by one provider, 103 
but have a political dimension to their business as well, because they affect 
meaning and thus shape public opinion. 104 Niva Elkin-Koren comments:
 They structure categories in response to users ’ queries, and thereby 
have the capacity of creating categories for grasping the world. By de-
fi ning which information becomes available for each query, search en-
gines may shape positions, concepts and ideas. 105 
 Their capability to shape public opinion is magnifi ed by user expec-
tations that the search engines will provide relevant and reliable search 
results. This is a question of quality, on which there is no consensus of 
meaning. 106 In an interview of leading former or current employees of 
major search engine providers, Elizabeth Van Couvering concluded that 
conceptions of quality followed two lines of reasoning: the market schema, 
which is interested in the business aspect of search engines and judges 
 96  DiMaggio, n 82 above, at p 42. 
 97  Ibid. 
 98  n 17 above, at p 17. 
 99  n 94 above, at p 1421. 
 100  Burns,  ‘ Top 10 Search Providers, June, 2007 ’ at  http://searchenginewatch.com/3626726/print (last 
visited 5 June 2008). 
 101  n 17 above, at p 24. 
 102  n 64 above, at p 170. 
 103  See  KinderStart.com, LLC v  Google, Inc. , Case 5:06-cv-02057-JF (2007) (DC N.Cali), discussion below 
4.3.2 sub-heading  ‘ Removal at Search Engine Behest ’ . 
 104  Elkin-Koren, n 93 above, at p 185. 
 105  Ibid. at pp 185-186. 
 106  Van Couvering,  ‘ Is Relevance Relevant? Market, Science, and War: Discourses of Search Engine 
Quality ’ (2007) 12(3) Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 866. 
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quality on customer satisfaction, and the science/technology schema from 
an engineering viewpoint that judges quality based on the relevance of 
search results. 107 Regardless of the approach, she concluded that they leave 
little room for issues of public interest such as fairness or bias. 108 Reliabil-
ity does not go to the authenticity and credibility of a site per se, but is 
directed rather at the expectation of unbiased search results. As an exam-
ple, Google has overtly encouraged users to rely on it to assess the value of 
websites, and to depend on its rankings as a reliable indicator of quality, 
worth and relevance. A user can download PageRank to his or her toolbar, 
which will then advise the user, on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being the high-
est, of the importance of the page being viewed. Google advertises the serv-
ice by asking  ‘ [w]ondering whether a new website is worth your time? ’ 109 
 The act of framing a user’s information experience makes search 
engines indispensible to access to information on the Internet thus elevat-
ing their product to public good status. 110 
 4.2  The Diffi culty with imposing a Public Interest Duty 
 Mann and Belzley rightly warn that there is a potential chilling effect in 
imposing any liability on gatekeepers for the services they provide, 111 as this 
might upset the market balance and chill the provision of goods and services. 
Yet this may be justifi ed when there are social benefi ts to imposing respon-
sibility that outweighs the resulting burdens. 112 Imposing responsibility on 
search engines for the purportedly automatic rankings might also chill inno-
vation, and suggested solutions to the rankings issue often involve a form of 
imposed innovation (i.e. modifying algorithms for randomized ranking 113 ). 
 Further, manual manipulations can play an important role in protect-
ing the relevancy of search results in the increasingly common situation of 
link farms and search engine optimisation. 114 In addition, some assert that 
the notion of search engine neutrality is a  ‘ myth ’ , because there can be no 
objectivity when editorial control determines the results. 115 This focuses 
on the wrong issue, which is, rather, the importance of search engines to 
information access and public discourse. 
 107  Ibid. 
 108  Ibid. at p 17. 
 109  ‘ Toolbar for Internet Explorer Help Center ’ at  http://www.google.com/support/toolbar/bin/
static.py?page=features.html (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 110  See discussion, n 64 above, at p 178-181. 
 111  n 12 above, at pp 273-274. 
 112  Ibid. For further discussion on market solutions see Elkin-Koren, n 93 above, at p 103. 
 113  Pandey  et al. ,  ‘ Shuffl ing a Stacked Deck: The Case for Partially Randomized Ranking of Search En-
gine Results ’ (2005) at  http://oak.cs.ucla.edu/ ~ cho/papers/cho-shuffl e.pdf (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 114  See discussion below 4.3.1. 
 115  Goldman,  ‘ Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism ’ (Draft), position 
paper presented at the Regulating Search Symposium, Yale Law School, 2005 at  http://islandia.law.yale.
edu/isp/regulatingsearch.html (last visited 10 July 2007). 
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 Search engine providers should become responsible when  ‘ publishing 
and disseminating the information they gather. ’ 116 However, this respon-
sibility is not without drawbacks. Authoritativeness invites certain negative 
consequences, in that authority lends credibility 117 to, for example, state-
ments by women about their ex-boyfriends on  www.dontdatehimgirl.com . 
With responsibility comes an increased cost of negotiating this responsi-
bility, which limits entrance to an already concentrated market. 118 In addi-
tion, some search engines such as Google are vulnerable if accountability 
is imposed because users and businesses engage in their own manipula-
tion of rankings. 
 Online intermediaries are recognizing the important ethical role they 
play in their dealings with oppressive regimes in Asia and the Middle East. 119 
Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and Vodafone are working with the Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, Human Rights 
Watch and the Center for Democracy and Technology to frame a code of 
conduct. 120 Their purpose is to commit to principles for the protection of 
human rights guiding businesses in the challenges faced by doing business 
internationally. 121 More recently, Google has gone further in its efforts to 
fi ght government censorship of the Internet by asking US trade offi cials to 
treat censorship of the Internet as a barrier to international trade. 122 
 These businesses should be encouraged to address their role as infor-
mation gateways and gatekeepers closer to home. Although the Internet 
as a whole refl ects a mixture of regulatory models from the traditional 
media, at the moment search engines are  ‘ lightly regulated ’ with a regime 
more akin to print media as it is  ‘ without guarantees for the citizen that 
are embodied in the public service model of broadcasting ’ . 123 Yet the 
press have long acknowledged their central role in democracy, and have 
adopted self-regulatory regimes to ensure that the public interest is met. 
 So far, search engines and online intermediaries generally have not col-
laborated to address whether it owes the public an obligation, and if so, 
what principles a self-regulatory regime might espouse. Behaviour is cur-
rently competitive and proprietary, with each company declaring its prior-
ity as the consumer, but at the same time shirking any notion of obligation 
 116  Pasquale,  ‘ Rankings, Reductionalism, and Responsibility ’ (Rough Draft) (2006) at  http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=888327 (last visited 25 June 2008) at p 18. 
 117  Ibid. at p 19. 
 118  See discussion, ibid. at p 19-27. 
 119  Google recognises its social importance to an extent. In 2004 it was reported that Google has an 
Ethics Committee that assesses changes to PageRank but no further information is available about or 
from this Committee: Orlowski,  ‘ Google’s Ethics Committee Revealed ’ at  http://www.theregister.
co.uk/2004/05/17/google_ethics_committee/print.html (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 120  Out-law.com,  ‘ Google, Yahoo!, Commit to Ethical Code ’ at  http://www.out-law.com/page-7682 (last 
visited 25 June 2008). 
 121  Ibid. 
 122  Rugaber,  ‘ Google Looks to U.S. to curb censorship ’ at  http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19372772/
print/1/displaymode/1098/ (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 123  n 17 above, at p 23. 
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regarding its power to shape meaning for the public. Google recently took 
a positive step with the launch of a public policy blog open to the public 
to contribute their opinions on policy issues. 124 As Frank Pasquale notes, 
search engines have become  ‘ the chief  organizer and  forum for research, 
public discussion, and commercial competition among internet users. ’ 125 
They are a central fi gure in facilitating the democratic potential of the 
Internet. Without recognition by the search engine businesses of this role, 
and collaboration to frame an accountability regime, they might be faced 
with government regulation to protect the public interest. 
 4.3  Search Engine Practices Affecting the Public Interest 
 The goal to protecting the public interest is the creation of a frame-
work that achieves accountability. This author proposes four priorities to 
achieving accountability: relevant and unbiased search results, a degree 
of transparency, respect for user dignity, and the implementation of an 
independent complaints mechanism. The lack of accountability is due 
to search engine practices associated with how they organize and rank 
information on indices. There are two levels to this lack of accountability. 
First, the design of the search algorithms fails to satisfy the above values. 
Second, the manual manipulation of rankings lacks transparency, consist-
ency, or explanation, which also fails to satisfy these values. 
 4.3.1  Algorithm Design 
 Each search engine operates differently, and is aimed at varying informa-
tion sources. Some search engines aggregate results from several search 
engines (meta-search engines such as InfoSeek), 126 while others target 
specifi c information such as scholarship or travel. The algorithms can be 
broken down into three categories: the spider approach, the directory 
approach and the popularity approach. 127 
 Search Engines function through the use of spiders or  ‘ bots ’ that crawl 
the hundreds and millions of pages on the Internet for information and 
record key words from these sites as well as their links. 128 A searchable 
index is then created of the words, and the spider will return to the sites 
regularly to look for changes. A user submits keywords for his or her search 
and is provided with a list of websites. 129 
 124  Metz,  ‘ Google launches self-protection blog ’ at  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/19/google_
public_policy_blog/print.html (last visited 5 June 2008). 
 125  n 116 above, at pp 33-34. 
 126  See discussion by Elkin-Koren, n 93 above, at pp 192-194. 
 127  See n 64 above, at pp 171-173. 
 128  See  http://www.searchenginehistory.com , n 20 above,  ‘ A History of Search Engines ’ at  http://
www.wiley.com/legacy/compbooks/sonnenreich/history (last visited 25 June 2008), and  http://www.
howstuffworks.com , n 16 above. 
 129  The term  ‘ keyword ’ is not used in its normative sense, but rather is  ‘ ‘ deduced ’ from the wepages 
themselves in the process of indexing ’ : n 64 above, at p 171. 
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 With the directory approach a website owner submits its website for 
approval to a human editor to be included on a list. 130 A user then searches 
the directory and is provided with matches based on descriptions of the 
websites submitted by the owners. 131 The most notable such directory is 
the original Yahoo! search engine, which started out simply as a list of the 
founders ’ favourite web sites, but grew quickly into a general directory 
of websites for public use. 132 Since 2002, Yahoo! has shifted to a crawler-
based approach, 133 however the directory still exists. 134 
 The popularity approach used by Google, involves a two-stage approach. 
First,  ‘ PageRank ’ assesses the importance of a web page based on popular-
ity. It counts  ‘ votes ’ of a page based on the number of sites linking to it, 
and the importance of the voting sites. Then the search engine analyzes 
the content of a web page. It used to rely on meta-tags, 135 but their suscep-
tibility to manipulation by owners in order to boost their rankings on the 
Google index led Google to move away from meta-tagging. Now, it assesses 
the content of a page based on the  ‘ fonts, subdivisions and the precise 
location of each word. ’ 136 
 These algorithms, particularly with respect to the Google approach, can 
create biased search results. First, popularity is assumed to equal impor-
tance, relevance and quality. 137 This results in a perpetuation of majority 
interests to the detriment of less  ‘ popular, wealthy and powerful sites ’ . 138 
Large, economically powerful companies surge to the top of the rank-
ings, while smaller companies that may not have the resources to invest 
in professionals with the know-how for search engine optimisation are 
ranked lower, if at all. In addition, more established websites become more 
entrenched at the head of the rankings because they have had more time 
to garner popular links. 139 This  Googlearchy 140 has the unfortunate effect of 
delaying recognition of, or excluding entirely, new, quality sites. 141 Linking 
 130  Sullivan,  ‘ How Search Engines Work ’ at  http://searchenginewatch.com/2168031/print (last visited 
25 June 2008). 
 131  Ibid. 
 132  ‘ The History of Yahoo!  – How It All Started ’ at  http://docs.yahoo.com/info/misc/history.html (last 
visited 25 June 2008), and see  http://www.searchenginehistory.com , n 20 above. 
 133  Sullivan,  ‘ Major Search Engines and Directories ’ at  http://searchenginewatch.com/2156221/print 
(last visited 25 June 2008). Yahoo! used Google technology to crawl the web, but in 2004 began using its 
own technology. 
 134  http://dir.yahoo.com/ (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 135  Meta tags were created by web page owners to specify the keywords and concepts under which a page 
was indexed: see  http://www.howstuffworks.com , n 16 above. 
 136  ‘ Technology Overview ’ at  http://www.google.co.uk/intl/en/corporate/techn.htm (last visited 27 
June 2007). 
 137  n 64 above, at p 181 See also n 113 above. 
 138  n 64 above, at p 31; n 115 above, at p 3. 
 139  Ibid. 
 140  n 113 above, at p 1. 
 141  Ibid. The authors noted that popularity ranking  ‘ can delay widespread awareness of a high-quality 
page by a factor of over 60 ’ : ibid at p 1. Pasquale notes that empirical research supports and dismisses this 
theory: n 116 above, at p 18. 
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popularity with quality creates an undesirable cycle of exclusivity. The very 
process of linking users to content providers sets up winners and losers. 142 
Some view this bias as merely a gap between the actual results and optimal 
results, 143 but this fails to take account of the entrenching effect of popu-
larity ranking. 
 Second, there is the problem of being highly ranked when one does not 
want to be. Individuals identifi ed in websites such as  www.dontdatehimgirl.
com , a website wherein women can warn others against dating their 
ex-boyfriends, or  www.iknowwhatyoudidlastnight.com showing images of 
individuals from parties, likely do not wish those websites to emerge high 
on the rankings when a personal name search is conducted. Google’s new 
Street View, recently exposed a lawyer from the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation as a  ‘ secret smoker ’ . 144 
 The practice of Google is to not intervene on the basis that the infor-
mation is stored on a third-party site. 145 Thus, when it comes to choosing 
not to be ranked, Google refuses to allow users to exercise this choice. 
This forces the user to contact the website owner directly. However, due 
to the search engine practice of caching, 146 removal of the disputed infor-
mation by the content provider does not mean that the information is 
then removed from a search engine’s search results, which might include 
a snippet of the relevant material. Nor is there the opportunity to pro-
vide a response on the search results page to what appears about you. 147 
Yahoo!, on the other hand, does not advise of any practice regarding the 
removal of sites in its Terms of Service. 148 This is equally detrimental to 
users, because it lacks transparency, and lacks a standard against which to 
judge accountability. 
 Italy recently enacted the  ‘ right to be forgotten ’ . This law arose from 
a complaint made to  Garante Per La Protezione Dei Dati Personali (the pri-
vacy authority) wherein an administrative violation against a company that 
occurred several years before continued to appear fi rst on the indices of 
a search engine, and no longer refl ected the company’s current informa-
tion. 149 It held that the institution should have done something, but did 
not elaborate on the nature of this obligation. 150 The resulting  ‘ right to 
be forgotten ’ was implemented in Italy’s data protection code, binding 
 142  Grimmelmann, n 16 above, at p 15. 
 143  n 116 above, at p 17. 
 144  Holahan,  ‘ Google Is Watching You ’ at  http://www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/
jun2007/tc20070622_338015 (last visited 26 June 2007). 
 145  n 116 above, at p 7. 
 146  Caching refers to the temporary storing of websites in order to make the Internet work more 
effi ciently. 
 147  n 116 above, at p 17. 
 148  ‘ Yahoo! Terms of Service ’ at  http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (last vis-
ited 25 June 2008). http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1113806 (last visited 25 June 2008) 
(translated orally by Andrea Glorioso). 
 150  Ibid. 
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institutions, rather than search engines, to remove decisions regarding 
sanctions from its website after a reasonable amount of time. 151 Although 
the page may still be accessible and searchable from the institution’s web-
site, it must be excluded from general-purpose search engines. 152 Italy’s 
Data Protection Authority recommends that public bodies advise search 
engines of an expiry date for the retrieval of pages with personal informa-
tion. 153 At the Spring Conference of European Data Protection Commis-
sioners, Mauro Paissan reported that Google is working jointly with the 
Data Protection Authority to address these issues where out-of-date mate-
rial is ranked high on search results advising of, for example, an arrest, 
but failing to rank the subsequent acquittal. 154 
 Third, search engines, website owners, and users are grappling with 
the desire of many site owners to be highly ranked. Companies recognize 
the importance of being ranked highly and compete fi ercely for the top 
ten slots on the fi rst search result page. The primary means of improving 
ranking is search engine optimisation (SEO) and the purchasing of top 
slots. Thus experts in the fi eld of  ‘ search engine design ’ have emerged, 
teaching companies how to optimise their rankings by anticipating the 
algorithms, 155 making SEO an industry unto itself. 156 Rankings are some-
times manipulated for sheer humour or political message. Known as 
 ‘ Google bombing ’ , the search term  ‘ miserable failure ’ famously returned 
President George W. Bush’s biography as the top search result until it was 
changed by Google two years later. 157 
 The fi rst form of search engine optimisation was through manipula-
tion of a company’s meta-tags, the key words the search engines read 
for indexing. 158 Search engines quickly changed their search algorithms 
to counteract this manipulation, so SEO now uses more sophisticated 
forms of manipulation such as creating websites that link to the pages 
in another group of websites in order to improve their popularity rank-
ing with Google, known as link farming. 159 SEO has also been used for 
other detrimental purposes, to push unfl attering company information 
further down the rankings, and even to prevent competitors from being 
highly ranked. 160 While search engines are criticized for protecting their 
 151  See  http://www.garanteprivacy.it/garante/navig/jsp/index.jsp?solotesto=N (last visited 25 June 
2008). 
 152  n 150 above, at p 161. 
 153  Paissan,  ‘ Privacy Protection and Right to Know, Striking a Diffi cult Balance ’ at  http://www.garanteprivacy.
it/garante/doc.jsp?ID=1408388 (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 154  Ibid. 
 155  n 91 above, at p 3. 
 156  For one such company, see:  http://www.searchengineoptimising.com/ (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 157 Sullivan, ‘ Google Kill’s Bush’s Miserable Failure Search & Other Google Bombs ’ at http://searchengineland.
com/070125-230048.php (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 158  n 91 above, at p 3. 
 159  Ibid. 
 160  See Grimmelman, n 16 above, at p 39. 
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algorithms as trade secrets, such transparency would arm SEOs with 
the information needed to further manipulate the rankings leading to 
stacked, largely commercial and not necessarily relevant search results. 161 
Although such practices skew the relevancy of search results, a degree of 
SEO is necessary to allow companies to design their websites appropriately 
for the algorithms so that the search results best refl ect relevancy. 162 Even 
without transparency, search results are visible, so companies have been 
relatively successful at reverse engineering to manipulate their placement 
in the rankings. 163 What has resulted is a constant tug-o-war between com-
panies and search providers, affecting the relevance of search results, and 
hindering the ability to frame a relevance principle that a search engine 
provider could be accountable for. 
 In addition, companies commonly enhance their position in the rankings 
by purchasing the top slots or key words. 164 The visibility of paid sponsors 
has been the subject of investigation by the US Federal Trade Commission 
demanding that they be identifi ed separate from normal search results. 165 
Google has always separated normal from paid search results, but this does 
not translate into user knowledge of what this separation means. A study 
by the Pew Internet & American Life Project found that only 38 per cent 
of American users are aware of the difference between paid and unpaid 
results. 166 Without users understanding what a paid sponsor is, the effort 
to alert consumers requires something more robust. The lack of sophisti-
cation in the average user combined with the lack of transparency of the 
companies that deliver search results creates an aura of authority of search 
results without any corollary accountability by providers. 
 There are further issues that shall not be developed here, but which 
should be noted, such as the effect of fi ltering mechanisms on ranking. 
In an  ‘ Empirical Analysis of Google SafeSearch ’ , Bejamin Edelman found 
that Google’s SafeSearch, a voluntary fi lter for sexually explicit mate-
rial, also fi ltered innocent sites such as the US Library of Congress and 
the National Middle School Association. 167 In addition, one can argue 
that the business model of search providers affects the search results, 168 
because revenue is generated largely through user fees, advertiser fees or 
website fees. 169 Further, search engines have been sued for selling third 
 161  n 64 above, at p 174; n 116 above, at p 36. 
 162  n 64 above, at p 174. 
 163  Grimmelman, n 16 above, at p 44. 
 164  n 64 above, at pp 174-175. 
 165  A letter from the FTC regarding this matter is available at  http://www.yahoo-watch.org/ftc1.html 
(last visited 25 June 2008). 
 166  Fallows,  ‘ Internet searchers are confi dent, satisfi ed and trusting  – but they are also unaware and 
naive ’ at  http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/146/report_display.asp (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 167  Edelman,  ‘ Empirical Analysis of Google SafeSearch ’ at  http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/
google-safesearch (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 168  n 91 above, at p 4. 
 169  Ibid. 
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party trademarks to be used in sponsored links and advertisements. This 
might be misleading because, for example, a user searching for  ‘ playboy ’ 
on Netscape or Excite at the turn of the century would have found other, 
likely topically related, sites that were neither owned nor sponsored by 
Playboy. 170 
 4.3.2  Manual Manipulation of Rankings 
 Search engines have intervened to manipulate rankings in two respects. 171 
First, they have removed links from indices in response to complaints con-
cerning content. 172 Second, they have removed links at their own behest. 173 
There is a lack of consistency between and within these categories regard-
ing when and why a search engine will manipulate rankings, and policy 
is required to fi ll this gap. Google, being the market leader, is the target 
of most news and lawsuits in this respect, and therefore will be discussed 
extensively in this section. 
 Complaints and Removal  As a general rule, Google will not remove a link 
from its indices; since a third party owns the site Google advises its users to 
contact the third party. 174 If the web site owner restricts access to his or her 
site or removes it entirely from the web,  ‘ Google would consider on a case-
by-case basis requests to remove the link to that site from its indices. ’ 175 
 Google has removed sites that it deems offensive, however. Last year, 
Google received complaints about killbattyn.com, a blog hosted on its 
blogger.com service, which advocated the killing of gays and lesbians. 176 
Initially Google refused to remove the site on First Amendment grounds, 
stating that  ‘ [t]here are many things on the Web which groups fi nd upset-
ting or distasteful … It is up to governments to decide at the end of the day 
where freedom of speech begins and ends. ’ 177 Effectively denying any role 
in disseminating the hate material, it  ‘ passed the buck ’ to government. 
Google fi nally removed the site relying on blogger.com’s terms of serv-
ice, but refused to elaborate further on the specifi c terms that it deemed 
were breached. 178 This, however, is an instance where it acted as a host 
of the content provider rather than as a search engine. With regards to 
 170  Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v  Netscape Communications Corp. 354 F.3d 1020 (9 th Cir. 2004). For further dis-
cussion of trademarks issues see n 61 above. 
 171  There is a third category for removals required by law, but it will not be discussed herein. 
 172  See  ‘ An explanation of our search results ’ at  http://www.google.com/explanation.html (last vis-
ited 25 June 2008), and D. Goodin,  ‘ Google removes gaybashing website ’ at  http://www.theregister.
co.uk/2007/03/02/google_removes_site/ (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 173  n 116 above, at p 23. 
 174  Ibid. at p 7. 
 175  ‘ Google Terms of Service For Your Personal Use ’ at  http://text.usg.edu:8080/tt/wifi .google.com/
ggterms.html (last visited 25 June 2008). See discussion by Pasquale, n 116 above, at p 6. 
 176  Goodin, n 172 above. 
 177  Ibid. 
 178  Ibid. 
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search results, Google was prompted to issue a statement regarding anti-
Semitic sites topping the rankings when the search term  ‘ Jew ’ was used, 
explaining why this might occur and expressing condemnation, but stop-
ping short of removing the site. 179 Pasquale commented that the fact that 
Google responded raised questions about whether  ‘ certain types or [sic] 
sites or particularly sensitive information  by their very nature [are] unde-
serving of the type of publicity high-ranked results provide ’ . 180 Google 
used the opportunity to elaborate further on its policy regarding removal 
of sites stating:
 Individual citizens and public interest groups do periodically urge us 
to remove particular links or otherwise adjust search results. Although 
Google reserves the right to address such requests individually, Google 
views the comprehensiveness of our search results as an extremely im-
portant priority. Accordingly, we do not remove a page from our search 
results simply because its content is unpopular or because we receive 
complaints concerning it. We will, however, remove pages from our 
results if we believe the page (or its site) violates our Webmaster Guide-
lines, if we believe we are required to do so by law, or at the request of 
the webmaster who is responsible for the page. 181 
 This response evidences Google’s perspective that intervention would 
taint the value of the search results, but closer examination reveals a form 
of double-speak. On the one hand, Google will only remove pages in three 
circumstances: where it is required by law, at the request of the Webmaster, 
or due to a violation of their Webmaster Guidelines. With regard to the 
latter, these Guidelines are only concerned with breaches caused by efforts 
to manipulate rankings such as  ‘ link schemes ’ and  ‘ sneaky redirects ’ . 182 
On the other hand, Google reserves the discretionary right to act on indi-
vidual requests. Google’s Code and Yahoo! Terms of Service employ even 
broader language denying any responsibility but also any accountability. 
Google reserves the right, but not the obligation  ‘ to pre-screen, fl ag, fi l-
ter, refuse, modify or remove Content ’ . 183 Similarly Yahoo! reserves the 
right to pre-screen, refuse or remove any content based on violations of 
the Terms of Service or if it is deemed  ‘ otherwise objectionable. ’ 184 This 
behaviour represents search engines’ broader attempt to restrict their 
 179  n 172 above,  http://www.google.com/explanation.html . The explanation is currently ranked 7 th on 
the search results for the term  ‘ Jew ’ (as at 24 June 2008). 
 180  n 116 above, at p 9. 
 181  n 172 above,  http://www.google.com/explanation.html . 
 182  ‘ Webmaster Guidelines ’ at  http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.
py?hl=en&answer=35769 (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 183  ‘ Google Code ’ at  http://text.usg.edu:8080/tt/wifi .google.com/ggterms.html (last visited 25 June 
2008). 
 184  ‘ Yahoo! Terms of Service ’ at  http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html (last vis-
ited 25 June 2008). 
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roles to that of mere directory or conduit, while simultaneously empower-
ing themselves to censor without explanation or accountability. 
 Removal at Search Engine Behest  The power of search engines to punish web-
site owners for behaviour it deems objectionable is evident in cases such as 
 Search King Inc. v.  Google Technology Inc. 185 Search King introduced PR Ad 
Network (PRAN) in 2002 to act as a middleman between clients and third 
party sites highly ranked by Google’s algorithm. The purpose was to im-
prove their clients ’ rankings in Google search results. PRAN would arrange 
for the advertisement of the clients on these third party sites. 186 This was 
effectively a link farm. Google ranks websites between 1 and 10, with 10 be-
ing the best ranking. In 2002, Search King’s ranking decreased from 8 to 4, 
while PRAN’s ranking went from 2 to being eliminated completely from the 
ranking. 187 Search King soon after fi led a lawsuit alleging tortious interfer-
ence with contractual relations. Google argued that its PageRank is pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment. US District Court Judge Miles 
La Grange reasoned that PageRank relates to matters of public concern, 
but that it is impossible to prove that the ranking given to a web site is 
false. 188 She dismissed the action, concluding that the search results are 
opinions and accordingly protected speech. 189 The opinion Google was ex-
pressing was as to  ‘ the signifi cance of particular web sites as they correspond 
to a search query. ’ 190 Without access to the algorithms and reasons for man-
ual manipulation decisions, plaintiffs cannot evidence that a drop in rank-
ings is untoward or illegitimate. Categorizing search results as expressions 
of opinion exacerbates this, because it further insulates search engine pro-
viders from accountability for their products. Arguably, search engines can 
now engage in openly discriminatory manipulations under the protection 
of it being opinion, although this would be a public relations nightmare. 
 Subsequently, in  Kinderstart.com LLC et al v.  Google Inc ., 191 Google relied 
on  Search King ’ s fi nding that its search engine results were opinion. 
Since 2000 KinderStart has operated a website dedicated to information 
related to small children. 192 In 2005, Kinderstart alleged that its site’s traf-
fi c dropped by 70 per cent, and its AdSense revenue dropped by 80 per 
cent. 193 KinderStart  ‘ realized ’ that the website was no longer listed with 
the same visibility in Google’s search results (Google apparently advised 
that this would occur). 194 In addition, KinderStart’s website received a 
 185  n 81 above. 
 186  Ibid. at p 2. 
 187  Ibid. 
 188  Ibid. at p 4. 
 189  Ibid. 
 190  Ibid. 
 191  n 103 above. 
 192  Ibid. at p 3. 
 193  Ibid. at p 4. 
 194  Ibid. 
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PageRank of  ‘ 0 ’ . 195 KinderStart claimed various causes of action such as 
violation of free speech, attempted monopolization and unfair competi-
tion. 196 US District Court Judge Jeremy Fogel granted Google’s motion to 
dismiss the case in a strongly worded judgment highly critical of Kinder-
Start.com. It is not the purpose herein to assess the reasonableness of the 
Judge’s dismissal of the case, 197 but rather to use the case to highlight 
Google’s view of its function as articulated in its Brief to the Court. 
 Google characterized its search engine as (a) an expression of opin-
ion (b) by a private business (c) about the importance of websites. 198 The 
value to websites, it asserted, was  ‘ promotion of [the website’s] message 
via Google. ’ 199 Drawing an analogy to other lists or indices that serve a 
promotional purpose, it argued:
 Over the years, authors who felt their books belonged on bestseller lists, 
airlines who thought their fl ights should be featured more prominently 
in airline fl ight listings, bond issuers dissatisfi ed with their ratings, and 
even website owners angry about Google’s ranking of their sites, have 
turned to litigation seeking to override such judgments. Each time, the 
courts have rejected such claims, recognizing that private businesses 
have a right to express these opinions freely. 200 
 It later emphasized:  ‘ Google’s index and its search results are a private 
forum for Google’s speech. ’ 201 With reference to the zero-rating received 
by KinderStart, Google characterized this simply as a difference of opin-
ion regarding the site’s quality. 202 
 Search King and  KinderStart highlight the mismatch between the criti-
cal importance of search engine results to companies ’ viabilities, and the 
immunity of search engines from any form of liability or responsibility 
for the indices.  KinderStart highlights the impossibility of succeeding at a 
claim against a search engine provider for changes in a company’s rank-
ings on a search index, because how or why the change occurred cannot 
be quantitatively proven. Judge Fogel stated that  ‘ [t]he Court concludes 
 195  Ibid. at pp 4-5. 
 196  Ibid. at p 2. 
 197  Judge Fogel reprimanded KinderStart’s lawyer for making unsupported claims regarding the compa-
nies treatment of other companies, relying on double hearsay or hearsay speculation, and concluded that 
the behaviour was sanctionable against the lawyer: see Williams,  ‘ Judge boots out Google delisting suit ’ 
at  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/03/21/kinderstart_thrown_out/print.html (last visited 25 June 
2008), and Out-law.com,  ‘ Google search rank claim thrown out for second time ’  http://www.out-law.
com/default.aspx?page=7901 (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 198  Google’s Notion of Motion and Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, and Memorandum 
of Points, 2006 WL 1232481 at p 8. 
 199  Ibid. at p 9. 
 200  Ibid. at p 6. 
 201  Ibid. at p 10. 
 202  Google’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, 2006 
WL 3619654 at p 7. 
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that the allegation that Google sell priority placement in its results should 
not have been made based upon the limited information identifi ed by 
[the plaintiff’s lawyer] ’ . 203 The search algorithms are protected as trade 
secrets, and the reasons for manual manipulation of rankings, particularly 
in any given case, are not publicly or privately revealed. This results in a 
quagmire wherein businesses rely on the search results, yet have no access 
to understanding changes in such results, even when the changes have a 
marked impact on the company’s sustainability. 
 5  Public Interest Framework 
 Search engines are indispensible tools for sorting through the overwhelm-
ing amount of information available on the Internet, and organizing it in 
a coherent, accessible manner. Search providers might bitterly refl ect that 
public interest-type obligations are punishing them for being good at what 
they do. However, the idea that search engines are merely  ‘ businesses ’ 
or  ‘ promotional services for website owners ’ is untenable. If information 
is becoming a critical commodity in modern society, then such bodies 
that manage access to information, that are tools for public discourse and 
democracy, should be accountable to the public. When the structure for 
access shapes meaning for its users, and infl uences public opinion, this 
need for a public-interest obligation is magnifi ed. 
 What would be the goal for a framework of public interest obligation? 
In short, the goal is to create accountability. Such a proposition seems 
straightforward, but like disputes in traditional media, it becomes murky 
when attempting to defi ne the qualities of this accountability and how it 
should be implemented. The goal, guided by traditional media is  ‘ that 
these are carried out well and according to principles of effi ciency, justice, 
fairness, and respect ’ . 204 Three values should be prioritised: relevant and 
unbiased search results, a certain degree of transparency, and respect for 
user dignity. In addition, for any of these values to have meaning, there 
must be a check on their power and practices, and therefore an independ-
ent complaints mechanism should be implemented. 
 5.1  Relevant and Unbiased Search Results 
 Users want relevant and reliable search results. Pasquale describes having 
two mutually reinforcing goals: authoritative search results, and respon-
sibility as information gateways. 205 Treating relevancy as a matter of pub-
lic interest raises complex issues. How can we determine relevancy when 
there is no transparency on the part of the businesses involved? How can 
 203  n 197 above,  http://www.out-law.com/default.aspx?page=7901 . 
 204  McQuail2, n 32 above, at p 47. 
 205  n 116 above, at p 14. 
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we even expect reliable and authoritative search results if the indices are, 
as argued by the providers themselves, merely directories or indices of 
third party information? Should reliability be a factor when dealing with 
the dynamic and participatory nature of the Internet? 
 Several ideas have been proposed to achieve more relevant, unbiased 
search results. Partially randomized ranking has been suggested to coun-
ter-balance the problem of entrenchment. The suggestion is to  ‘ promote 
a small fraction of unexplored pages up in the result list ’ 206 to randomly 
chosen rank positions. Publicly funded search engines have also been 
suggested. 207 France and Germany have cooperated to fund the Quaero 
Project, led by Thomson.net and involving several other companies, with 
the goal of,  inter alia , creating a search competitor to the American com-
panies. 208 Further, the development of Wikia should be followed closely. 
Created by the founder of Wikipedia, Wikia is a for-profi t search engine 
with one distinguishing feature: it is open source, 209 meaning that the 
search algorithms will be accessible to anyone to review, modify or use on 
other websites. 210 
 Some posit that relevancy will take care of itself. The increase in person-
alized ranking algorithms, it is argued, will render bias irrelevant, because 
results are tailored to the interests of the user. 211 Search engines are begin-
ning to move in this direction with Yahoo! ’ s  ‘ Yahoo! Mindset ’ and Google’s 
option to order results based on past searches. 212 This shift of reliance to 
personalized searches as the panacea to the current problems should be 
cautioned against. It underplays the values at stake, is a privacy concern, 
and encourages balkanization of knowledge and experience. 
 Although users are becoming savvy and might  ‘ mix and match ’ search-
ing on various search sites, 213 the availability of alternative search engines 
does not adequately address user dependency on search engines, nor satis-
fi es the public’s interest in relevant search results. 44 per cent of American 
searchers regularly use only one search engine, while 48 per cent use only 
two or three. 214 Further, concentration of the market, and domination by 
 206  n 113 above, at p 2. 
 207  See, for example, n 115 above, at p 4. 
 208  Baker,  ‘ Quaero European Search Engine Goals and Plans ’ at  http://www.searchenginejournal.com/
quaero-european-search-engine-goals-and-plans/2766/ # more-2766 (last visited 25 June 2008). See also 
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quaero (last visited 25 June 2008). It has been reported that Germany is 
no longer a part of the Quaero Project, and started project Theseus to develop a text-based search engine, 
whereas Quaero is focused on multimedia search: ibid. 
 209  MacKinnon,  ‘ Jimbo Wales: Google’s China mistake ’ at  http://rconversation.blogs.com/
rconversation/2007/08/jimmy-wales-goo.html (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 210  Auchard,  ‘ Wikia Plans Community-Based Search ’ at  http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,135275-
c,companynews/article.html (last visited 20 August 2007). 
 211  n 115 above, at p 6. 
 212  Ibid. at pp 6-7. 
 213  See discussion of the quality of search engines other than Google in Beam,  ‘ FrankenGoogle ’ at 
 http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2172222 (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 214  n 166 above. 
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Google followed not-so-closely by Yahoo!, undermines the argument that 
there is suffi cient diversity in the market to address issues of relevancy. 
Even if users had a diversity of competitive search engines, this does not 
negate the need for a public interest obligation, nor is an answer to it. 
 Any public interest in relevancy must be realistic. Businesses must expect 
fl uctuations in rankings, and not every website can be highly ranked, nor is 
every undesirable link going to be caught and removed. Relevance is hard 
to measure, because it is as much dependent on the users search terms as 
it is on the algorithm of the provider, and results can be manipulated by 
google bombing, search engine optimisation and the like. For relevance 
to have meaning, the key is consistency: consistency in algorithms, consist-
ency in decision-making regarding any manipulations of search results, 
and consistency in the values that drive such manual manipulation. 
 5.2  Transparency 
 For relevance to be of any value, there must be openness about how the 
algorithms work and when and why the providers make certain decisions. 
This author hesitates to go so far as call it transparency, because full trans-
parency is not promoted here. 
 Several authors have argued for transparency of how search results are 
reached, both automated and manual. 215 Nissenbaum and Introna com-
ment:
 As a fi rst step we would demand full and truthful disclosure of the 
underlying rules (or algorithms) governing indexing, searching, and 
prioritizing, stated in a way that is meaningful to the majority of web 
users. 216 
 Nissenbaum and Introna see transparency as the optimal solution, 
because it enables users to make more informed decisions about which 
search engines to use and for what. 217 Without transparency, how is a user 
to assess relevance? 218 There are diffi culties with full transparency, however, 
including impacting competition among providers, stymieing incentives to 
innovate, arming users with knowledge to manipulate the rankings, and 
risking user privacy if transparency requires disclosure of user queries. 219 
 This author views the negative consequences of disclosure of algo-
rithms on the market as suffi ciently concerning that blanket transparency 
should not be the solution. Further investigation is required to determine 
the potential market fallout of full algorithmic transparency. However, 
disclosure should be required regarding manual manipulations. Such 
 215  For example, see n 115 above, at p 74, and Grimmelman, n 16 above. 
 216  n 64 above, at p 181. 
 217  Ibid. 
 218  Elkin-Koren, n 93 above, at p 191. 
 219  See discussion by Grimmelman, n 16 above, at p 44-50. 
 at London School of econom
ics on Novem
ber 2, 2010
ijlit.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC INTEREST: AN EXAMINATION OF SEARCH ENGINE ACCOUNTABILITY
140
openness would alleviate user concerns to understand how a sudden shift 
in ranking occurs, and achieve accountability from search providers now 
aware that their decisions are under scrutiny. 
 5.3  Respect for User Dignity 
 User dignity must be addressed separately, because the participatory nature 
of the Internet, and the speed with which information is spread, increases 
the power and incidence of unsavoury and defamatory information circu-
lating. This concern is compounded when potential employers, businesses 
partners, or curiosity seekers perform a name search and such informa-
tion appears high on the rankings. 220 Several incidents have arisen lately. 
Two Yale law students have sued one of the administrators of  www.autoadmit.
com , a bulletin board for discussion of American colleges, and several 
 ‘ John Doe ’ authors, for defamatory comments posted by anonymous users 
on the law forum. 221 One Plaintiff insists that her inability to fi nd a job 
after graduation was in part caused by prospective employers  ‘ googling ’ 
her name and fi nding discussion threads concerning her from AutoAd-
mit high on Google’s search results. Whether this allegation has any merit 
is yet unclear, but is serves to highlight the role of search engine results 
in fi nding such information. It is increasingly standard procedure to vet 
a prospective employee by searching social networking sites and search 
engines. A recent survey suggested that 35 per cent of American employ-
ers conducted a name search of potential employees. 222 Should individuals 
have control over access to such information? Pasquale comments that if 
individuals may control the transfer of personal information in other are-
nas such as banking and medicine, then perhaps similar controls should be 
implemented regarding such information sought via search engines. 223 
 Search engine providers advise users to contact the content providers 
directly, and this approach is appropriate but does not provide a complete 
solution. Search engines ’ caching function allows the information to sur-
vive longer than the content provider might intend. The Internet Archive 
WayBackMachine service allows user to search  ‘ archived versions of web-
sites ’ advertising  ‘ [i]magine surfi ng circa 1999 and looking at all the Y2K 
hype ’ . 224 Both Yahoo! and Google allow users to click on a  ‘ cached ’ function 
taking them to a cached version of a website if it is available. 225 Once on the 
 220  See, for example, ReputationDefender, a business set up to search for and remove undesirable per-
sonal information from the Internet:  http://www.reputationdefender.com (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 221  Doe I and Doe II v  Anthony Ciolli et al,  http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/06/the_
autoadmit_l.html (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 222  Du,  ‘ Job candidates get tripped up by Facebook ’ at  http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20202935/
print/1/displaymode/1098 (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 223  n 116 above, at p 16-17. 
 224  Internet Archive  ‘ Frequently Asked Questions ’ at  http://www.archive.org/about/faqs.php # The_
Wayback_Machine (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 225  This author searched  ‘ Y2K ’ on both search engines showing this result. 
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cached site, Yahoo! also provides direct links to the WayBackMachine for 
further searching. While website owners may request that their content not 
be cached, 226 they cannot be a full-service outfi t to respond to complaints 
regarding content. Collaboration of search engines is necessary to success-
fully remove the content. 
 In circumstances where a person wants content to be removed, or to no 
longer appear on the rankings, Pasquale suggests that in meritorious cir-
cumstances, where a complainant alleges a false or misleading search result, 
an asterisk should be placed next to the result linking to the complainant’s 
website where he or she can tell his or her side of the story. 227 He defends this 
suggestion not as imposed free speech but rather as  ‘ a way of restructuring 
a forum with deep roots in our First Amendment tradition. ’ 228 In Italy, the 
 ‘ right to be forgotten ’ has been implemented, and although it is directed at 
content providers rather than search engines, Google has been collaborating 
to make this right effective. 229 As in the cases of  Search King and  KinderStart , 
many website owners want their websites to be highly ranked. It has been 
suggested that when a website drops suddenly in the rankings, the solution is 
for these owners to be informed of what caused the sudden change. 230 
 Should search engines have a takedown obligation akin to ISPs under 
the Electronic Commerce Directive? The latter has been criticized for over-
censoring content because a mere complaint without proof of the contents 
defamatory nature justifi es taking down of the content. If applied to search 
engines it would fundamentally undermine freedom of expression to an 
extent far more invasive than an obligation on ISPs, ultimately failing to 
serve the public. The above suggestions provide possible solutions to some 
of the rankings controversies, but they address small portions of a much big-
ger problem. For a user’s dignity to be respected, a one-size-fi ts-all approach 
will not work. Owners, users, and concerned citizens need a place where 
their complaints can be heard. For relevance, transparency, and user dig-
nity to have any real value, there must be a body to deal with complaints. 
 5.3  Independent Complaints Mechanism 
 Cases such as  KinderStart and  Search King illustrate the need for a complaints 
mechanism for website owners concerned about sudden shifts in their 
position on the rankings, or high rankings of undesirable information. The 
responses of search engines thus far have been unsatisfactory and makes 
clear that any such complaints mechanism must be independent. For such 
a mechanism to be effective there must be a code of practice to ground the 
 226  Google Help Center at  http://www.google.com/help/features.html # cached (last visited 25 June 
2008). 
 227  n 116 above, at p 28. 
 228  Ibid. at p 30. 
 229  n 149 above. 
 230  n 116 above, at p 32. 
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nature of search engine obligations, and a standard against which a deci-
sion maker can determine if the code has been breached. 
 In Germany, the Association of Voluntary Self-Regulating Multimedia 
Service Providers ( ‘ FSM ’ ) 231 implemented a Subcode of Conduct for 
Search Engine Providers for the purpose of consumer protection and pro-
tection of children. It states that although information intermediaries  ‘ do 
not make their own content available … [t]hey are, however, aware of their 
particular Role in making information available on the Internet. ’ 232 Thus, 
this Code is an expression of commitment to abide by three main rules: 
disclosure of how the search engine functions; identifi able separation of 
normal search results from paid placements; and the enabling of techni-
cal precautionary measures for the protection of children from harmful 
content. 233 Members of FSM are only bound by the Code if they are signa-
tories to it, and it is as yet unclear who has signed on to it, although mem-
bers of FSM include Google, Lycos, and MSN/Microsoft. 234 Although 
this Code addresses issues critical to any code governing search engine 
conduct, something more comprehensive is needed to address user com-
plaints regarding undesirably high or low rankings. 
 What would be the characteristics of such a complaints mechanism? A 
complete discussion of such a mechanism would require a separate arti-
cle. Therefore, this article will offer some thoughts on comparative regula-
tory structures and the values an optimal regime might possess. 
 Guidance can be found from the media where various regulatory structures 
are used. Any structure will be exposed to the many criticisms made of media 
regulators; that they are ineffective, merely  ‘ public relations operations ’ , 235 
and might only serve to stave off legally enforceable safeguards. 236 However, 
cases such as  KinderStart and  Search King show the inability of the courts to 
currently manage such claims, and legal regulation might be undesirable, 
and perhaps would upset the market balance and chill innovation. 
 On a national level, there are two options. First, the preferable route is 
to adopt a self-regulatory regime akin to the Press Complaints Commission 
(PCC) in the United Kingdom. Although newspaper proprietors fund the 
PCC, 237 it is an independent body established for the purpose of resolving 
complaints from the public concerning content in newspapers or maga-
zines. 238 The PCC’s main role is to enforce the Code of Practice, 239 drafted 
 231  Feiwillige Selbstkontrolle Multimedia-Diensteanbieter at  http://www.fsm.de/e/SubCoC_Search_
Engines (last visited 22 July 2007). 
 232  Ibid. 
 233  Ibid. 
 234  Ibid. 
 235  Robertson & Nicol,  Media Law (London: Penguin Books, 4 th ed, 2002) at p 675. 
 236  Ibid. 
 237  Ibid. 
 238  PCC,  ‘ What is the PCC? ’ at  http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/whatispcc.html (last visited 25 June 2008). 
 239  PCC,  ‘ Editors ’ Code of Practice ’ at  http://www.pcc.org.uk/assets/111/Code_Aug_2007.pdf (last 
visited 25 June 2008). 
 at London School of econom
ics on Novem
ber 2, 2010
ijlit.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
EMILY B. LAIDLAW 
143
and updated by the Editor’s Commission whose members are from the 
industry. 240 The Code sets the ethical standards for journalists regarding, 
 inter alia , accuracy of publications, protection of children, discrimination, 
and the use of hidden cameras and listening devices. 241 The PCC is not 
funded by government, nor is it under statutory control, 242 and the service 
is free to the public. 243 The Commission members are laypersons, and cur-
rently include only one person from the industry. 244 The Commission can-
not sanction a newspaper or editor fi nancially, but may only require that 
the Commission’s decision be published by the newspaper or magazine 
found to be in breach of its Code of Practice. Such a regime is advanta-
geous because it is voluntary, created by members of the industry, inde-
pendent from government, and relies on the commitment of the industry 
to abide by decisions of a tribunal rather than through penalties and fi nes. 
Of course, it is this very lack of legally enforceable power that exposes 
the PCC to criticism, 245 and raises doubts as to its compliance with human 
rights laws. 246 The roots of press freedom in freedom of expression reso-
nate with search engines, and a light regulatory approach may be optimal 
to create the consistency and openness sought from search engines. 
 Second, a quasi-governmental regulatory regime might be adopted. The 
UK’s Offi ce of Communications (OFCOM) operates as such a regulator for 
the broadcasting industry. 247 The British Government set up OFCOM under 
the Communications Act, 2003. 248 Its duties are far more extensive than the 
PCC, ranging from promotion of competition, to diversity of broadcasting 
content, and to protection of consumer privacy. 249 The Communications 
Act and the Broadcasting Act 1996 required that a code be drafted to set the 
standards for radio and television, 250 which  ‘ Broadcasting Code ’ came into 
 240  Ibid. 
 241  Ibid. 
 242  PCC,  ‘ Governance and Accountability ’ at  http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/governance.html (last vis-
ited 25 June 2008). 
 243  PCC,  ‘ Key Benefi ts of the System of Self Regulation ’ at  http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/benefi ts.html 
(last visited 25 June 2008). 
 244  PCC,  ‘ Frequently Asked Questions ’ at  http://www.pcc.org.uk/faqs/index.html # faq1_8 (last visited 
25 June 2008). 
 245  Further examination of such a regime requires consideration of the weaknesses of self-regulation, 
as discussed by scholars such as Julia Black in, for example,  ‘ Decentring Regulation: Understanding the 
Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a  “ Post-Regulatory ” World ’ (2001) 54  Current Legal Problems 103, 
in which she describes self-regulation as a  ‘ normatively loaded term ’ : at p 3. 
 246  In  Peck v  United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41, the European Court of Human Rights held that since 
the media commissions lacked the legal power to award damages, they could not provide an effective 
remedy to Peck under article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 247  See  http://www.ofcom.org.uk/ (last visited 25 June 2008). For further discussion of OFCOM see n 
37 above. 
 248  2003 Chapter 21. 
 249  OFCOM,  ‘ Statutory Duties and Regulatory Principles ’ at  http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/sdrp/ 
(last visited 25 June 2008). 
 250  OFCOM,  ‘ Legislative Background to the Code ’ at  http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi /codes/bcode/
tvbcode_b/ (last visited 25 June 2008). 
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effect on July 25, 2005. 251 Unlike the PCC, the Code is enforced through a 
condition in every licence that it be observed, 252 and failure to adhere to the 
Code may result in fi nes or forfeiture of the licence. 253 
 The complexity and concerns regarding an OFCOM structure are far 
more than indicated herein. 254 Such complexities are exacerbated if one 
attempts to apply it to the Internet, because of the political ramifi cations of 
attempting pubic regulation of a transnational communications network. 
However, at this stage a fundamental question is whether a complaints 
mechanism is better run by the industry, with government involvement, 
or by international collaboration and so on. OFCOM is merely one exam-
ple of a quasi-governmental approach. It is advantageous in binding the 
industry to the Code, and the threat of licence removal is signifi cant to 
deter certain behaviour. Whether it is effective, or used for that matter, is 
uncertain as OFCOM is still in its infancy. 
 The principles for government intervention in broadcasting do not 
resonate as acutely with search engines as the self-regulatory regime of 
the PCC. The concentration of the market faced by both industries is par-
allel, but broadcasting invests in further public interest regulations such 
as diversity of programming and public service broadcasting, and it is not 
clear that search engines require such a re-structuring of the forum. Ran-
domized ranking may arguable be a form of diversity imposition, but this 
author hesitates to conclude that government involvement will necessarily 
protect the public interest without further investigation of the potential 
stifl ing of market innovation. 
 One signifi cant hurdle to a complaints mechanism is the transnational 
nature of Internet communications and of the search engine providers 
themselves. How can such a system be implemented when varying laws and 
values bind each nation? This terrain, however, is not exclusive to search 
engine providers, nor the Internet. Efforts to tackle issues concerning,  inter 
alia , domain names, hate speech, defamation, and electronic commerce 
have been addressed at a national and international level since the Internet’s 
inception. Recognition of search engines as affected with a public interest 
and requiring regulation is simply the fi rst step, and another important 
issue to be added to burgeoning stack of quandaries we are encountering. 
 6  Conclusion 
 Access to information has become one of the most important features 
of modern society. The Internet has fundamentally changed how we 
 251  Ibid. 
 252  Ibid. 
 253  Carey & Sanders,  Media Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 3 rd ed, 2004) at p 241. 
 254  For a discussion of the evolution of media policy and the changes brought about by the  Communica-
tions Act , n 248 above , see Vick,  ‘ Regulatory convergence? ’ (2006) (26)1  Legal Studies 26. 
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communicate and our relationship to information. It is a discursive plat-
form, where the costs of contributing are low, and the opportunity to 
express opinions from the insipid to the profound are available at our 
fi ngertips. It is, indeed, a democratizing force, and its ’ increasing pen-
etration rate as a key medium for users propels its force forward. It has 
moved beyond a mere information portal to one that shapes meaning 
and self-development. 
 Yet with this growth has come information clutter. Over one billion peo-
ple use the Internet, creating millions upon millions of pages for con-
sumption. Search engines have emerged as managers of information, 
organizing and categorizing content in a coherent, accessible manner, 
shaping public opinion and the user’s information experience. Users have 
become dependent on search engines, viewing them as authoritative and 
reliable. Search engines have become the tools through which the demo-
cratic potential of the Internet can be advanced or hindered. 
 The way that information is organized and ranked on search engine 
results, the story of the searched that is created, is capable of harm. Sudden 
shifts in rankings can cripple a company, while individuals might fi nd that 
scurrilous commentary or defamatory statements are the foremost links con-
cerning them on search indices. Where can such companies or individuals 
turn? With regards to the latter, individuals might contact the website owner 
or administrator, but removal from the website does not ensure removal 
from the Internet or search engine results. Otherwise, they have no redress. 
Search engine practice is, generally, not to intervene, nor to provide infor-
mation concerning the cause of shifts in rankings. Yet, search engines, such 
as Google, do intervene to manipulate rankings, but the public is not privy 
to information regarding when it occurs, for which sites, or why. 
 There is a chasm between the role of search engines to democracy, and 
the lack of any framework of accountability for its practices. A public interest 
framework is needed to bridge this gap and protect consumers in order to 
further their ability to engage in public discourse and access information. 
 Three values should be present in such a framework: the value of rel-
evant and unbiased search results; the value of a degree of transparency 
concerning algorithms and reasons for manual manipulation, and respect 
for the dignity of the users recognizing that how information is presented 
on indices can cause harm. 
 For any of these values to have meaning, for these values to be consid-
ered standards in the industry, there must be an independent complaints 
mechanism for individuals and companies to turn to for resolution of con-
fl icts. Search engine providers might form such a mechanism themselves, 
but they must fi rst recognize their role as more than mere directories, or 
expressions of opinion, and embrace their position as a critical demo-
cratic force for the Internet. 
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